Stolen Sign-In Sessions Let an Attacker Into Microsoft 365 Mailboxes at 79 Organizations, No Password Needed

Many workplaces tell staff that turning on multi-factor authentication (MFA) keeps their email safe. It helps a lot. But a campaign described by security firm Huntress shows its limit: if a criminal grabs the "you're signed in" pass that Microsoft hands out after you finish MFA, they can walk in as you without knowing your password or touching your phone.

What happened

Huntress says that between July 14 and September 22, 2026, it tracked an attacker replaying stolen Microsoft 365 sign-in tokens against business accounts. The firm responded to related incidents at 79 organizations and counted at least 497 successful sign-ins, alongside more than 200,000 failed attempts. The Hacker News, reporting on October 26, says 97 accounts were ultimately compromised. The replays came from an address range belonging to 1337 Services GmbH, a hosting provider that Help Net Security describes as incorporated in Hamburg, Germany. Nobody has been charged, and the operator has not been publicly identified.

How the trick works

Huntress calls the method "token spraying." In the most common version, a victim is lured to a fake sign-in page that secretly acts as a relay, known as adversary-in-the-middle. The relay shows the real Microsoft login and passes along the real MFA prompt, so everything looks normal. Once the victim finishes, the relay keeps the session token. Since that token was issued after MFA, whoever holds it doesn't have to pass MFA again.

Tokens also came from device-code phishing, where someone is talked into typing a short code on a genuine Microsoft page that actually approves the attacker's device, and from social engineering during an otherwise legitimate login. Huntress observed that a hijacked session sometimes reappeared from the attacker's servers within minutes: 12 minutes in one July case and just four in September.

What the attacker did once inside

According to Huntress, the intruder registered at least 48 rogue devices in Microsoft Entra, the identity system behind Microsoft 365, wiped victims' MFA methods and replaced them with their own, and created inbox rules to hide messages from the real owner. In one case the compromised mailbox sent a payroll-related email to an outside contact. That is classic business email compromise groundwork: change where paychecks or invoice payments go, and make sure the real employee never sees the replies.

Warning signs for employees

Why MFA still matters

None of this makes multi-factor authentication pointless. It still makes stolen passwords much harder to use on their own, which helps explain why these criminals went after finished sessions instead. Huntress's figures illustrate that: more than two hundred thousand failed tries against a few hundred successes. Phishing-resistant options, such as passkeys or hardware security keys, are designed so a lookalike relay site cannot complete the handshake on your behalf. Ask your IT department whether those are available for your account.

A quick habit that helps

Before typing a password anywhere, glance at the address bar. Microsoft's genuine work sign-in lives on its own domains, and a fake relay usually sits on an unfamiliar web address, sometimes with misspellings or extra words. Better yet, bookmark your company's real portal and open it from there instead of following links. If a message pressures you with urgency, such as an expiring mailbox, a missed delivery or a salary update, slow down and check the request through a channel you already trust. Huntress also notes that blocking one hosting provider will not stop the scheme on its own, since the fake pages and the replay servers sat with different companies.

What organizations can do

Huntress says properly configured Conditional Access policies can prevent this kind of replay. If an account is hit, its advice is to revoke the user's sessions and reset the password, then remove any devices and MFA methods the attacker added, because a password reset alone leaves those in place. It also recommends checking for newly created inbox rules. Security teams should review recent sign-in logs for unusual locations, new device enrollments and odd client applications, then brief finance staff, managers and help-desk workers so everyone knows what a suspicious request looks like.

For payroll and vendor-payment requests, confirm any change of bank details through a phone number or contact you already have on file, never one supplied in the email itself. If you think you were targeted, tell your IT team right away. Readers can also contact us or use our report page.

Featured in FraudMeNot Daily, Oct 28, 2026.

Sources

Published October 27, 2026 by FraudMeNot Team. Label: Real, reported.

Disclaimer. General education only, not legal, financial or security advice. No guarantee. Consult a qualified professional. News summaries are based on the sources listed and may change as more is reported.

General education only, not legal or security advice. FraudMeNot is not affiliated with Microsoft, Huntress, 1337 Services GmbH or any other company named here. Findings are as reported by the researchers and news outlets cited and have not been independently verified by us.