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OpenBSD OpenSSH: Exploited Flaw CVE-2026-123158

Published November 9, 2026 · Last updated November 9, 2026

OpenSSH CVE KEV Patch

What happened: On November 9, 2026, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) added CVE-2026-123158, a flaw in OpenBSD OpenSSH, to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. The catalog lists flaws CISA has evidence attackers are using. CISA calls this one the "OpenBSD OpenSSH Unexpected Status Code or Return Value Vulnerability."

CISA's summary: "OpenBSD OpenSSH on Linux contains an unexpected status code or return value vulnerability that could allow for authentication bypass."

CVE-2026-123158 lets an attacker log in over SSH without the right password on some Linux machines. It does not affect every OpenSSH server. It applies when sshd is built against the musl C library and checks passwords itself, without PAM. Alpine Linux is the best-known system that works this way, and the Alpine Linux project published a detailed advisory on November 5, 2026. The OpenSSH project shipped portable release 10.6p2 the same day to close the hole.

How the bypass works

When sshd runs without PAM, it checks a password by hashing the attempt with the C library's crypt() function and comparing the result with the stored entry for that account. Alpine explains that when the stored field is too short to hold a salt, sshd borrows the salt from another account on the system. The musl version of crypt() returns a single asterisk to signal an error when the input is longer than 256 bytes. Alpine notes that an asterisk is also exactly what the stored field contains for every account with no password. A very long attempt therefore produces an "error" string that happens to equal the stored value, and the login is accepted.

The OpenSSH maintainers say they do not consider the root cause to be inside OpenSSH, but that sshd is well placed to avoid it. Their fix commit adds a check that the stored field is at least four characters long before a password match is accepted.

Who is exposed

According to Alpine, every one of these conditions has to be true:

  • The machine runs sshd from the openssh-server package, which Alpine builds without PAM, or from openssh-server-pam with UsePAM no.
  • PasswordAuthentication is set to yes, which is the OpenSSH default.
  • At least one account has an asterisk in its password field. On Alpine this includes root in base images since about release 3.16, any key-only user created without a password, and users supplied by a directory service through musl-nscd.
  • At least one local account has a password stored as a $5$ or $6$ hash. Alpine notes that a single such user makes every account without a password reachable.

Root is protected by the default PermitRootLogin prohibit-password. Alpine warns this does not help if another reachable account can become root, for example through doas.

Alpine lists as not affected: containers that do not run sshd, systems with password logins turned off, openssh-server-pam with UsePAM yes, locked accounts marked with an exclamation mark, systems with no $-style hash at all, and cloud images configured by cloud-init, which disables password logins.

Alpine's official tiny-cloud images from 3.18.11 through 3.24.3 ship an alpine user with no password and passwordless doas. They are safe on first boot but become exploitable once any hashed password appears, for example when an administrator sets a console password.

The CVE record describes the affected range as OpenSSH before 10.6p2 on Linux with musl and without PAM, naming Alpine only as an example. The official sources reviewed here do not list other musl-based distributions or embedded images, so their status is unknown. Owners of such systems should check with their supplier rather than assume either way.

Signs of real attacks

CISA added CVE-2026-123158 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on November 9, 2026. KEV listing means CISA has evidence of exploitation, and CISA's coordinator assessment on the NVD record marks exploitation as active. Neither CISA nor the vendors describe how widely it has been abused or by whom.

CISA set a due date of November 12, 2026. That deadline applies to U.S. federal civilian executive branch agencies under the directive CISA cites. For everyone else it is a strong signal to act quickly, not a legal deadline.

Severity and where the numbers come from

MITRE, which assigned the CVE, scores it 8.1 High under CVSS 3.1, with high attack complexity and no privileges or user interaction required. NVD shows this as a secondary score from MITRE and has not published its own. The OpenSSH release notes call the change a critical security workaround but give no CVSS figure.

The sources differ on the password length. The CVE record says any password between 256 and 1024 characters succeeds. Alpine says 257 to 1024 bytes. This page reports both and does not try to reconcile them.

Fixed versions

Upstream, the fix is in portable OpenSSH 10.6p2. On Alpine, the fixed point releases are 3.21.10, 3.22.8, 3.23.8 and 3.24.4. Those are distribution release numbers. The fixed openssh package strings differ by branch: 10.6_p2-r0 on edge, 10.3_p1-r2 on 3.24, 10.2_p1-r1 on 3.23, 10.0_p1-r11 on 3.22 and 9.9_p2-r1 on 3.21. Alpine also published packages back to 3.16 even though those branches no longer get regular support. Older stable branches carry a backported patch rather than the new upstream version, so a lower OpenSSH number on Alpine is not by itself proof of exposure.

Checking your own systems

Without testing logins against any machine, administrators can confirm the facts that matter. Find which hosts run sshd and expose it to networks you do not trust. Check whether each is Alpine or another musl-based build, and whether it uses the PAM variant. Read the effective server setting with sshd -T and look for the password authentication line. Then review which accounts have no password versus a locked one, without copying hash values out of the system.

Upgrading the package does not replace a daemon that is already running. Alpine stresses that sshd must be restarted afterwards.

Alpine's guidance for spotting abuse is to look in /var/log/messages for sshd lines reading "Accepted password" for an account that has no password. It also suggests reviewing doas use, recently created users, files and authorized keys. If a login cannot be ruled out, Alpine says to treat the machine as compromised.

Interim mitigation and its side effects

If an upgrade cannot happen right away, Alpine's official workaround is to set PasswordAuthentication no and restart sshd. Alpine states that either the update or this change closes the hole on Alpine systems. The official sources reviewed here do not say whether the same change is enough on other musl-based builds.

Turning off password logins also locks out anyone who still relies on a password to reach the machine. Alpine advises confirming that SSH key login works first and keeping the current session open until a new login has been tested. As a general operational precaution, not part of the vendor guidance, also confirm a console or out-of-band recovery path before restarting the daemon on a remote server. Alpine's steps also edit matching lines inside Match blocks and cover older releases that ignore the drop-in directory, then check the effective value, because a setting left elsewhere could keep password logins on. The workaround is a stopgap and does not replace the fixed package.

Patch, workaround and who acts

Patch: install portable OpenSSH 10.6p2 or later, or on Alpine run the package upgrade so that the fixed openssh build for your branch is installed, then restart sshd.

Workaround (Alpine official, temporary): set PasswordAuthentication no, check the effective setting and restart sshd, after confirming key-based or console access.

Who acts: administrators of Alpine and other musl-based servers that run sshd apply the update and restart the service. Cloud teams update running instances built from affected tiny-cloud images. Security teams review authentication logs on exposed hosts. Suppliers of other musl-based images confirm whether their builds are affected.

What the National Vulnerability Database says

NVD first published CVE-2026-123158 on November 5, 2026. Its description, from the record's source ([email removed]), reads: "sshd in OpenSSH before 10.6p2 on Linux, when musl libc is used without PAM, lacks a workaround for a password authentication bypass (related to misinterpretation of whether a string is intended to be a password hash). For some configurations of accounts, any password between 256 and 1024 characters succeeds. An example of a platform using musl libc without PAM is Alpine Linux."

How serious is CVE-2026-123158?

The CVSS 3.1 base score is 8.1 out of 10 (High), scored by mitre.org. In plain terms: an attacker can reach the OpenSSH weakness over a network, including the internet; the attacker does not need an account; no one has to click or open anything. The listed impact on OpenSSH data secrecy is high, on data integrity high, and on availability high. The full vector is CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.

Which OpenSSH versions are affected?

The CVE record lists these affected ranges:

  • versions before 10.6p2

If your OpenSSH version falls in one of these ranges, check OpenBSD's advisory for the fixed release that applies to you.

Weakness identifiers on the CVE-2026-123158 record

  • CWE-394 is listed on the KEV catalog entry or the NVD weakness field. This ledger row does not include a stored MITRE definition for it.

CISA required action for CVE-2026-123158

CISA's required action for this KEV catalog entry, quoted from the catalog record, is: "Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA’s BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA’s “Forensics Triage Requirements” (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines."

Timeline for CVE-2026-123158

  • November 12, 2026: due date for U.S. federal civilian agencies to act on CVE-2026-123158.
  • November 5, 2026: NVD publishes CVE-2026-123158.
  • November 9, 2026: CISA adds CVE-2026-123158 to the KEV catalog.
  • November 9, 2026: latest change to the NVD record (status: Analyzed).

Advisories and technical references

The NVD record for CVE-2026-123158 links to these references; tags in brackets are NVD's labels:

What to do

  • Run OpenBSD OpenSSH? Follow OpenBSD's own advisory (linked under Sources) and apply the fix or mitigation it lists. CISA's required action for this entry is to apply the vendor's mitigations, or stop using the product if no mitigation is available.
  • Federal civilian agencies must act by November 12, 2026, CISA's due date for this entry. Other organizations can use that date as a deadline for OpenSSH too.
  • Ransomware use: CISA lists known ransomware campaign use for CVE-2026-123158 as "Unknown".
  • Don't run OpenSSH yourself? You don't need to install anything on your phone or home computer for this. If a call, text, or pop-up says your device is infected by "CVE-2026-123158" and asks for payment or remote access, that is a scam pattern, not a OpenBSD alert.

CVE-2026-123158 record details from CISA and NVD

  • CISA forensic triage flag for CVE-2026-123158: Yes
  • Attack complexity for CVE-2026-123158: high
  • CVE-2026-123158 CVSS scope: unchanged
  • NVD sub-scores for CVE-2026-123158: exploitability 2.2, impact 5.9.
  • Who mapped the weakness type: the address listed on mitre.org (Secondary)
  • NVD product identifiers (CPE): cpe:2.3:a:openbsd:openssh:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*, cpe:2.3:a:openbsd:openssh:10.6:-:*:*:*:*:*:*, cpe:2.3:a:openbsd:openssh:10.6:p1:*:*:*:*:*:*
  • References in the NVD record: 5 (1 tagged Patch, 1 tagged Mailing List, 1 tagged Vendor Advisory).
  • CISA SSVC decision points for CVE-2026-123158 (from NVD): exploitation=active; automatable=no; technicalImpact=total (role: CISA Coordinator, SSVC 2.0.3).

Sources

General education only, not security advice. Facts checked against the sources above on the date shown.